This article describes protocological rhetoric as a conceptual tool for exploring and changing institutions. Protocological rhetoric is an extension of two lines of thought: Porter, Sullivan, Blythe, Grabill, and Miles's institutional critique and Science & Technology Studies's (STS) concept of information infrastructure. As a result, protocological rhetoric imagines institutions as networked information infrastructures. This article describes the method and provides an example through historical case study. I suggest that the approach provides methods for actively transforming institutions.
complex problems. Radical and disruptive change can lead to unpredictable and disturbing results, especially in institutions that have a long historical legacy, institutions like the modern university system. More is recorded and known about the institutions of the past, and the rules written by previous generations serve to provide sensibility to change. Tradition is important for coherency (Gadamer, 1965) . Disruptive change throws out both the rules and content of the institution. Radical upheaval should be seen as a last resort because of the unpredictably of the outcomes. Disruptive action has its place, but the history of the university suggests that perhaps less radical change may be more likely to create lasting change that is beneficial. Indeed, this is what some of our scholars had in mind when they wrote about institutional critique in 2000 (Porter, Sullivan, Blythe, Grabill, & Miles, 2000a) .
This article furthers a conversation about institutional critique and its role in changing education (Bousquet, 2002; Grabill, Porter, Blythe, & Miles, 2003; Murphy, 2004; O'Neill, 2002; Porter et al., 2000a) . After reviewing the existing discussions about institutional critique, I suggest the concept of protocological rhetoric as a supplement to further institutional critique as a methodology for change. Protocological rhetoric is an analytic tool synthesized from research in information infrastructure studies (Bowker, Baker, Millerand, & Ribes, 2007a) . It is the outcome of understanding institutions as large information infrastructures that change through micropractices that result in large-scale change. These changes generally work in the long-term scale of decades or centuries, but that's not always the case. In this study, I draw on a historical case study to explain the idea. This case is particularly useful because it provides a particularly expedient, though decade-long, example of protocological rhetoric.
REVIEWING INSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE
In Porter et al.'s 2000 institutional critique article, the authors describe a methodology for change that advocates realistic local action as a method to invoke large-scale change. The authors' contrast their critique with more idealist philosophies of change that advocate major revisions to institutions. The problem that these authors see in idealist perspectives is that they are too easy for the powerful to dismiss. In the words of the authors, " [i] dealized wish lists are far too easy to dismiss using 'budgetary realities' as a rationale" (Porter et al., 2000a, p. 616) . I can't help but imagine some of the issues that are currently plaguing idealistic changes in the healthcare system. Too many different groups disagree about the fundamentals of the issue. Getting all the parties to agree about the outcomes and means is close to impossible. Complex social systems are complex because of the different perspectives, histories, and desires of the participants. Radical change may be theoretically beneficial, but that doesn't necessarily appeal to the short-term sensibilities of those currently in power.
Porter et al.'s discussion of postmodern geographies in their 2000 article does a good job of highlighting that problem (p. 613). The metaphor of postmodern geographies simultaneously suggests the interconnectedness and disconnectedness of large social institutions. Institutions are contiguous since they interface as part of a larger social set of institutions, yet they are also disconnected, since the participants are culturally and politically diverse. Reconfigurations of the geography change the benefits of any particular postmodern position, but they don't create overall benefit-they reconfigure the landscape of benefit. This is the same issue that has concerned theoretical discussions within post-colonial studies. Institutions are connected, but there's always a violence to that connection. In the 21st century, this idea seems almost given: institutions are large and complex entities; the people within them are often at odds because of their positioning; it is unlikely that any one policy will benefit everyone, or even a majority. This idea had largely replaced the historically older conceptions of a politics that relies on stable ideas of them/us. Therefore, it seems odd that Marc Bousquet took such issue with the essay. Bousquet's "Composition as Management Science," while not an attack on institutional critique, advocated institutional change that was unionized, and he suggested that the language of institutional critique is really not new at all, that it is "but sounds exactly like the old 'partnership between labor and capital' rhetoric of nineteenth-century anti-unionism" (Bousquet, 2002, p. 516) . Bousquet says that he is sympathetic with the Porter et al. (2000, p. 494) argument, but ultimately he says that he sees it as less productive than his unionized strategies. It's difficult to see his sympathy as his article compares institutional critique to anti-unionism. Bousquet's union metaphor is forceful, but probably not particularly helpful for higher education, an institution where gender, class, and race complicate a them/us narrative.
Grabill, Porter, Blythe, and Miles point to this issue: it seems as if Bousquet is suggesting that the problem should be imagined in terms of them vs. us (Grabill et al., 2003) . They work to bridge their approach with Bousquet's, suggesting that a unionized and institutional critique approach can be harmoniously synthesized. More importantly, they write that Bousquet has underestimated the historical momentum of the modern university system. Leveraging the discussion of postmodern geographies, they rightfully point out that the modern university can't be explained particularly well with an approach in which the division of labor is well defined. Labor is simply too complex. They point out that institutions are not all alike and that they are not monolithic. They advocate a view of the modern university in which power fluctuates between institutional participants who play a role in reshaping them. They advocate a view of agency through institutional maintenance. Each person involved makes choices that either maintain or deviate from the historical weight of existing institutional practices. Each action generates a new set of causes and conditions for change.
This idea of maintenance becomes clearer when considering Grabill et al.'s discussion of Science and Technology Studies (STS). They rightfully point to the fact that institutions can be fruitfully seen as technologies. People shape technologies as institutions/technologies shape people in return. Not only this, but institutional critique proponents seem to have a more nuanced view of social relationships. The authors do important conceptual work as they describe the variegated nature of people, technology, and institutions, and they aren't satisfied with the less complex Marxist narrative that Bousquet describes. It's the variegated perspective of institutional critique that gives it its teeth as a methodology promoting institutional change. It reinvents the locus of agency, replacing Bousquet's narrative of dominated proletariat with a view of institutional denizens as inventors in a complex world. If action for change is required, it seems that a habit of mind that is proactive is particularly useful.
Grabill et al.'s comparison of institutions to technologies is also useful for refining institutional critique as methodology. In particular, STS's subfield of information infrastructural studies helps enrich institutional critique. Indeed, the words infrastructure and institution could almost be used interchangeably in much of the information infrastructural studies literature. Porter et al.'s description of institutions is particularly useful for making this comparison: "they are rhetorically constructed human designs (whose power is reinforced by buildings, laws, traditions, and knowledge-making practices) and so are changeable." It's Porter et al.'s subcomponents of buildings, laws, traditions, and knowledgemaking practices that map on so well to the concept of information infrastructure, because information infrastructure can be understood in terms of its classifications (buildings), standards (laws), protocols (traditions), and algorithms (knowledge-making practices). Although not the only point of institutional change, protocols (traditions) provide one method of intervention in institutions. Protocols provide one of the more powerful points of an institutional critique, as it seems as though Bousquet has dismissed the more complex definition of institutions and replaced it with a conception of monolithic power. Because Protocological rhetoric is the exploitation of infrastructural protocols as a means to institute change, the following section more thoroughly discusses information infrastructure as a means of better explaining protocological rhetoric.
REVIEWING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE
The familiar definition of infrastructure often evokes images of wires, roads, and boring technologies, and it could be easy to equate infrastructure with a long list of technological objects (Bowker, Baker, Millerand, & Ribes, 2007b; DeVoss, Cushman, & Grabill, 2009; Hart-Davidson, Bernhardt, McLeod, Rige, & Grabill, 2007) . This view of infrastructure only leads so far for studying it as a research phenomenon, and it is often more useful to think of infrastructure as a relational concept (Star & Ruhleder, 1996) . That is, infrastructure is a background that provides the affordances for foregrounded action of the social world. Infrastructure's background affordance is crucial for sustained human activity. The background fills in the gaps that would otherwise disrupt the stabilized activities of everyday activities, and lapses in infrastructure draw attention to its importance. For example, in North America, communities often can assume that clean water and electricity will be readily available. In the third world, this is clearly not the case as dehydration and electrical outages caused by lapses in infrastructure draw attention to its value (Edwards, 2003) . Because infrastructure is relational to sustained social activity, conceptually there is always infrastructure if there is sustained social activity. Infrastructure comes into being as a side effect of social dependence on a stable background. Infrastructure allows communities to assume stability wherever and whenever they are, which produces infrastructure's flattening of time and space.
Infrastructures do not expand across all space and time, however: the reach of infrastructure constrains its flattening potential. Infrastructure may only emerge for short periods of time, just long enough to provide the stability for a few seconds, a few days, or a few years. It may only be depended upon within a small geographic location. Infrastructures vary immensely. Often though, infrastructure spans much larger periods of time and much greater distances. It exists long enough so that actors can be institutionalized into depending on it without noticing it. This is especially true in the modern networked world where infrastructure has provided consistent dependence on technologies that provide water, food, electricity, transportation, and information.
Since infrastructure provides a general theory of background affordance, information infrastructure is a background theory of the affordances of knowledge work, which is particularly useful, since many modern institutions, like universities, are loci of knowledge work. Information infrastructure provides the dependability of information resources. These resources may include access to computers that link to large stocks of information (Bowker, 2005; Millerand & Bowker, 2009 ), but information infrastructure consists of any of the techniques that provide dependable access to information. This includes the institutional space that provides the ability for social actors to exchange ideas. In fact, these sorts of institutional spaces are often more pervasive, because they have a larger historical legacy that has become more engrained within institutional fabric. Indeed, it is often institutional space that plays a crucial role in the affordances provided by information infrastructure. One example of this includes the history of the telegraph messenger boy who demonstrated how the affordances of physical time and space became important factors for gendering and shaping information access during the 20th century, a gendering and shaping which still resonates today (Downey, 2002) . Another example is the now infamous history of the early female computer programmers being crucial to computation during World War II (Abbate, 2003; Light, 1999) .
Infrastructure is pervasive. It's built from layers upon layers of subcomponents that saturated the world (Bowker & Star, 1998) . As infrastructure becomes more complex, it begins providing support for more infrastructure, as can be seen by the TCP/IP "stack" of protocols that allow a person sitting in front of a keyboard to use the silicon in front of them to connect to web pages, which depend upon browser applications, which depend upon communication protocols, which depend upon more software, which depends upon hardware configurations, which depend upon the material affordances of a computer's parts (Blanchette, 2011; Kirschenbaum, 2007; Slaton & Abbate, 2001) . Perhaps the complexity of infrastructure is a primary reason why it can be difficult to see how microlevel practices link to macrolevel control and back again. Infrastructure, especially in the modern world, is twisted back upon itself, creating knots of institutional and social influence.
Infrastructure functions because of several key components. Most notably, these components are standards and classifications (Bowker & Star, 1999; Star & Ruhleder, 1996) . Later, it was suggested that algorithm and protocol were also fundamental components of infrastructure (Abbate, 1999; Galloway, 2004; . Together, standards, classifications, algorithms, and protocols are the techniques that provide stability across different times and spaces. They build dependability into infrastructure. Those infrastructure techniques are the techniques that allow for the infrastructural synchronization of time and space across vast distances, and they prescribe the digital techniques that allow one computer to communicate with another in different locations. While these computer technologies provide easy examples of infrastructural components like standards and protocols, it's also important to recognize the consistency provided by standardized, classified, algorithmic, and protocological techniques that are grounded in other ways. These include standardized paper forms, standardized rules and classifications, and standardized methods for collecting population information (Foucault, 1977 , Hacking, 1990 Rosenhaft, 2003; Timmermans & Berg, 2003) . The long history of the words protocol and standard are suggestive of just how long infrastructure has influenced social worlds (Feng, 2003; Timmermans & Berg, 2003) . Infrastructure provides the dependability of institutional rules and regulations. It connects micropractice to macrolevel through its components. It consequently provides the affordances on which micropractices depend.
Consider each part of infrastructure in more depth. Standards are descriptions of uniformity. They provide the dependability of units of measurement or regulations. For instance, inches and centimeters are dependable, though not necessary, to mark off standardized distances. Next, classifications provide the ontological framework for describing standards. They describe categorical terms that refract the world through a specific lens. For example, the race categories of the United State census provide the vocabulary that the U.S. government uses to distribute and organize race. Next, algorithms provide the rules that instantiate standards and classifications. They are the modes that provide tempos and register to the where and how of infrastructure. For instance, the software that instantiates TCP/IP for network communication is instantiated by algorithms defining when and how it should run. Protocol is a final tool of infrastructure. If algorithm provides tempo and register, protocol defines rules that are applied through tempo and register. Together, standards, classifications, algorithms, and protocols bring infrastructure into being. They allow infrastructure to gain force momentum as more and more communities depend on them on a regular basis (Edwards, 2003; Hughs, 1994) . Infrastructure changes the nature of social activity through its standardized, classified, algorithmic, protocological work.
Hypothetically, one small change in key parts of infrastructure would upset a larger technological system, but the most fundamental parts of infrastructure are providing the background for an enormous variation of shared activities. For instance, the power grid simultaneously provides access to computers and electrical cookware. Changing the frequencies that the power grid supports would theoretically have enormous impact on a vast number of utilities. Computers provide access to financial information and administrative software. For those trying to institutionalize change, it is likely the standards that are most important are the most difficult to change because they have become useful for some groups somewhere. Because infrastructure runs so deep, it can be difficult to change the parts that contribute most to undesirable institutions. Theoretically, change disrupts, but perhaps only small changes over time are practical.
One reason that infrastructure is difficult to change is because it consists of the micropractices of people who have been generating standards, classifications, algorithms, and protocols for centuries (Bowker, 1994) . Institutional rules and infrastructure in the academy and its classrooms, for example, carry the historical weight of work that had been done within the medieval German system and before (Readings, 1996) . The historical infrastructure often had a pragmatic use when it was institutionalized, but as time passed, infrastructure lolls behind. Its original pragmatic use reverberates the concept of pragmatic forward through time. Here I see a strong connection with institutional critique as it's proponents suggest that change is a slow process (Porter, Sullivan, Blythe, Grabill, & Miles, 2000) . Infrastructure resists change. Infrastructure solidified the needs of certain groups in a localized space and at a localized time. The thawing process is not necessarily fast. Therefore, those who seek to alter infrastructure work against the microactions of historical people in time as well as the microactions of contemporaries in different places (and vice versa). The historical weight of infrastructure carries the legacy of the past. Infrastructure is institutionality.
Given this discussion, information infrastructure can be seen as a powerful theoretical tool that helps to extend institutional critique while accounting for the viewpoints of its critics. The micropractices of institutional critique do make a difference, but they are already imbricated within an infrastructure that provides technological resistance. The microactions that generate infrastructure solidify into the macrolevel of institutional stability. It's the pragmatically materialized and dependable background that has built up over the span of history. Those hoping to change infrastructure face the resistance of a materialized history. Action aimed specifically at the components of infrastructure work to pervasively change institutions and infrastructure for the long term. I call this sort of work protocological rhetoric, a technique to analyze and change institutions as infrastructure.
Before a more extensive case study, the following mini-analysis of higher education micropractices helps to illustrate protocological rhetoric as a tool for institutional critique. The original institutional critique suggested that classroom critique would be strengthened by considering the position of the classroom in the institution (Porter et al., 2000, pp. 621-622) . The authors made this case well, and what I suggest is that by identifying how class spaces are infrastructured, we are provided a more powerful point for institutional critique. Consider for example that classroom space is often standardized in terms of seating. Some courses are assigned 200 person classrooms while others are assigned 20 person classrooms. These standards provide a regimented value being applied in each case and thus creating protocols for classes that facilitate the tenor of the course. Simultaneously, these infrastructural components have other ramifications. They are assigned and reinforce historical institutional logics that suggest some courses merit more bodies than other classes. In the current climate of higher education, more bodies often means more financial backing, as the economic climate of higher education attempts to push more bodies through institutions in less time. Large lecture spaces earmark forms of power (Gulbrandsen, 2012; Latour, 2005, pp. 194-196) .
This insight is one of the points where an infrastructural addition helps with institutional critique methodologies. Identifying and leveraging micropractices that work within the larger institution is one method, but it is influenced by the politics of work in other ways. Consider recent moves by governments within higher education that insist faculty post syllabi for the public. Classroom critique might identify how the syllabus could be leveraged in the micropractices of the classroom. But the attempt to standardize has already generated a powerful mediator that defines the concept of syllabus (Texas Legislature, 2009; Texas State University San Marcos, 2010) . Political categories have already been inculcated through infrastructural rules that define how we can talk about classrooms. Standards, classifications, algorithms, and protocols like these provide the background for more noticeable complaints about the crumbling university.
It is wise to be wary of uncritical claims about simply suggesting that increased class space will increase institutional power for certain people. As those in the academy proclaim again and again, power is more complicated, it flows through bodies, providing different affordances, but not placing individuals in some sort of cardinal order of strength (Foucault, 1977, pp. 97-99) . Larger classrooms can mean that more bodies can be placed in classrooms, and that generates a postmodern geography with a variety of pedagogical implications. Larger classes call forth pedagogical strategies for teaching more bodies at once, a pedagogical imperative which is not always desirable. Differences across the infrastructural capabilities in various institutions provides different affordances of power, which is highlighted by recent discussions about the affordances of virtual education (DePewa, Fishman, Romberger, & Ruetenik, 2006) . Information infrastructure draws attention to key points of institutional power, but it does not provide easy solutions to undesirable social conditions. As this is the case, information infrastructure does not alter institutional critiques suggesting that local micropractices can make a difference. It simply points to the significance of infrastructure as a place for social action.
Protocological rhetoric seeks to identify and exploit the infrastructural mechanisms of institutions. It can be difficult to step back to identify the relationship between components and their infrastructure because institutions are layered in standards, classifications, algorithms, and protocols. These participate in different configurations of infrastructure. Focusing analytic gaze on standards, classifications, algorithms, and protocols provides reflective space to better understand both infrastructures and institutions. Changing these components changes infrastructures and institutions. The following historical case provides an example of protocological rhetoric in action. By showing how protocols were important for institutional change, the case demonstrates protocological rhetoric. This particular case was selected for two primary reasons. First, it was well documented in archives, news stories, and public discourse. Second, it provides a case of protocological rhetoric happening in a short time frame, making the work of protocols easier to conceptualize.
PROTOCOLOGICAL RHETORIC IN ACTION
During the early 1990s, the University of California at Berkeley was wracked with financial problems. Tax funding for education in California was being cut for several reasons, one notable one being that the state was diverting resources to the Gulf War. California was in an economic recession, and funding at UC-Berkeley was cut. Between 1991 and 1993 California reduced funding to its university system by $254 million. At Berkeley, the school lost $45 million and more cuts were planned (Gordon, 1993) . Some faculty members suggested that the Berkeley School of Library & Information Studies was particularly affected because it did not generate grants from non-University sources like some other departments.
Because of the financial problems, several courses were cut and lecturers were laid off (Wilson, 2000, p. 205) , but the budget problems were not the only setback for the school. For the previous decade, UC-Berkeley's School of Library & Information Studies had problems keeping a permanent dean: several different interims had been serving since 1984 (Wilson, 2000, pp. 230-236) . By 1993, the school had witnessed four different deans in less than 10 years. Nancy Van House, the last of the lineage of interims, had been serving as an acting dean for 2 years. During this time, several administrators remarked on the school's lack of leadership (The Regents of the University of California at Berkeley, 2001) .
In addition to the problems, three different review committees at the University had urged the school to strengthen its program by devoting more resources to the study of information technology. In stark contrast to the budgetary problems, these reviews urged the school to expand and expend more resources. In short, the University was simultaneously suggesting that the school was an expendable budgetary expense while also suggesting that it needed to increase its operating costs. Judson King, a UC provost, described the situation as being "faced with either spending a million or saving $500,000 to $700,000" (St. Lifer & Rogers, 1993) . Given the escalating budget problems in California, these choices likely seemed double-edged: expanding would contribute to the budgetary problem; not expanding left a weak School to be cut from the budget.
The school made several attempts to address these varied problems, writing different proposals on two key occasions. In addition, on several occasions, faculty had written vision and mission statements to argue for the school's importance at Berkeley (School of Library & Information Studies, 1991; Wilson, 2000) . On several occasions, the school's administrative offices replied by suggesting the altered mission and vision for the school was still not important enough to warrant support (Heilbron, 1993; University of California, 1992) . On February 24th, 1993, admissions to the school were suspended for a period of 2 years (Miller, 1993) . Yet 2 years later in 1995, the school would reemerge as the School of Information Management and Systems, bearing some, but not all, resemblances with the former program.
This description provides just a few of the case's events, but one could imagine a variety of perspectives to reframe the happenings. In this case, advocates at Berkeley relied on the documentation of significant standards and protocols in order to evoke change, and they were constrained by existing institutional infrastructures in order to tell the story. The school's advocates could have told many different narratives. Was this a new discipline replacing an old? Was it an instance of state funding restructuring a school? Was it part of a larger history of librarians in the Information Age? Depending on the perspective, some aspects of the Berkeley events bear more importance than others. All these potential narratives could have been true. The interesting part is highlighting how certain takes-highlighted by the various documents-forward and consolidate some of these points of view while concealing others by drawing on the power of information infrastructure. Each proposal shows different attempts to leverage infrastructure.
The first proposal to salvage the school occurred in 1991 after initial suggestions from Berkeley administrative committees for the school to restructure. It is not the first documented proposal for change, but it does capture an important moment in the events at Berkeley. The document makes several attempts to argue for the school's visionary work, but as recorded in later committee responses, these specific attempts aren't successful. They do, however, appeal to an area of interest that would be returned to later: the key word "information."
Sandra Braman provides insight into one of the primary infrastructural terms of the proposal: information. Her descriptions of differing versions of information in policymaking provide a framework for understanding the classificatory work. She says that information is often described in four ways: as a resource, as a commodity, as a pattern, or as constitutive of society (Braman, 2006, pp. 11-25) . Information as resource is a thing that is a right and required by all individualssomething that is a human need. Information as commodity understands information as a good to be traded. Information as a pattern understands information as inherent only in its interpretation of larger contexts. This is the definition of information reminiscent of Shannon's information theory (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) . Finally, information as constitutive of society understands information as something ineffable and shaped by and through the social world. Braman argues that information as constitutive should be the bedrock for understanding any type of information in policy, including that of setting educational priorities. For Braman, the other meanings are secondary-they are classifications of the larger constitutive framework. Her reasoning is that the secondary meanings of information do work to conceal a variety of important social implications. For example, while information may be recognized and analyzed as a resource, it will simultaneously act as a force that can fundamentally alter communities.
Braman's research is not the only attempt to understand definitional work in information policy, but it is an important one. She combines a working typology that is inclusive of other research while acknowledging the complexity of each definition. For example, many of Michael Buckland's definitions of information may be included in her framework (Buckland, 1991) . His suggestion of information as thing may be reinterpreted as part of the resource aspect of Braman's typology. Yet Braman argues convincingly, which I see as a sign that her viewpoint is a powerful narrative of information in society. Braman suggests, "[t] he entire issue area of information is characterized by the recency of its emergence. Battles over the nature of the regime to dominate are still being fought, with the conflict over operational definitions a key battleground (Braman, 1989, p. 234) . This narrative shows up in the overriding ubiquity of the Berkeley infrastructural documents. The Berkeley case embodies one of her key battlegrounds, and her definition dovetails with the primary concepts of information infrastructure.
In a first proposal to save the school, the authors draw primarily on two definitions of information: information as resource and information as constitutive. The constitutive definitions, however, are secondary to the resource definitions. They seem as though they are attempts to assuage administrative requests for change rather than to embody a new direction. For example, until later administrative pressure, the school had suggested that its goals were "discovery, dissemination, and utilization of information" and "putting information to practical use" (School of Library & Information Studies, 1990) . And in 1990 when the school was asked to "reexamine their goals and to develop a new vision of the future" (Graduate Council Review Committee, 1990), they responded by suggesting their "central and unique expertise is in the organization of and access to information," while paying pittance to the idea that "we are also concerned both with the people, processes, organizations, and technology by which information is created, transmitted, stored, retrieved, and used, and with the social, political, economic, and legal systems within which information systems operate" (School of Library & Information Studies, 1991). The two points of view are separated. The second, more inclusive is an addendum to the first-an afterthought. The remainder of the proposal rarely mentions the constitutive definition again. The administrative response to this proposal was unimpressive, suggesting that "[w]hile the vision statement and the supporting materials represent a sincere effort to meet the challenge of several reviews it offers, to the outside reader, little more than an elaboration of earlier recommendations" (University of California, 1992) .
The school's proposal also suggests particular power around definitions of technology. As with the term information, several researches have been conducted arguing for differing societal descriptions technology within society. Carolyn Miller has identified four popular tropes of technology: hierarchical, monolithic, interactive, and reverse hierarchical (Miller, 1998, pp. 303-306) . Technology as hierarchical describes knowledge as prior to technology. Technology as monolithic depicts technology and knowledge as part of a black box-inseparable from each other. Technology as interactive describes technology and knowledge as "subcultures" with distinguishable "bodies of lore and competence" (Miller, 1998, p. 306) . In this model, technology and knowledge are closely related but separate entities. Finally, technology as reverse hierarchical depicts technology as driving knowledge. Miller leverages Lyotard's idea of performativity to describe this concept. To be fair, Miller focuses her efforts on defining the relationship between science and technology, but in this case, it is not too outrageous to draw a metonymic relationship between science and information science. Statements about information are highly integrated within the infrastructure framework of a University structure. When references to knowledge and information are made, they are often referring to the productions of the scientific community, broadly based.
In a vision statement from the time, we see a construction of information and knowledge as hierarchical to technology. Information comes first; technology is a propaedeutic used to filter information to the proper groups. This idea can be seen in statements like, "technology is a means toward an end." In the proposal, information comes first-technology follows. What we see in this first document is a construction of information as resource-or as thing as Buckland might say-and also as hierarchically before technology. It's not difficult to see a parallel between what Ron Day suggests is the conduit metaphor that often dominates conceptions of information. For Day, information is often understood as a thing that can flow through appropriate conduits (Day, 2000) . This notion is similar to Hayles's idea of how information was envisioned as circuitous during early cybernetics work (Hayles, 1999) . While I'm not suggesting that anyone at the Berkeley school supported one version of these concepts over others, these documents do leverage specific and self-fulfilling informational forms.
Stakeholders of the school later wrote another proposal to the Academic Planning Board at Berkeley to salvage the school. This group consisted of faculty members from several departments, administrators from UC-Berkeley, students from the school, and librarians from the University. This proposal was a response to a committee which had suggested the original proposal was inadequate and that it, "represent[ed] a sincere effort to meet the challenge of several reviews it offers, to the outside reader, little more than an elaboration of earlier recommendations" (University of California, 1992) . In the response to this, the first proposal's original descriptions of information and technology would break down. The school describes itself and its activities more fully, answers prompts given by the Berkeley administration, and begins mixing in some other parts of information and technology typologies proposed here. In this new writing, I would suggest that the original definitions are not necessarily the tropes that drive this new proposal.
The new proposal makes three noticeable appeals for the importance of the school. First, there is the repeated construction of information as resource. This can be seen in statements like "information is one of the world's most important and rapidly changing resources," and "the increasing importance of information in the professions . . . scholarship and research . . . and in daily life." The document paints a vivid picture of information as a human need. But what I am about to suggest, is that a prompt to argue for interdisciplinarity at the University exposes a different and more noticeable understanding. This attempt suggests that the school's importance is partially derived from its ability to remix the academic environment at Berkeley.
This new focus on interdisciplinarity is highlighted in several ways. First it is argued that this new discipline will be able to leverage Berkeley's "strength in such allied disciplines as computer science, business administration, cognitive science, and public policy." This suggestion is constantly used again and again, and perhaps with good reason. Patrick Wilson, former dean of the school, said in an oral history interview that one of the best ways to keep one's program from being cut at Berkeley was to integrate it into the activities of other departments (Wilson, 2000, p. 141 ). Wilson suggests that "departmental creation and destruction [was] a continuous process at Berkeley" and that "fiddling with doctoral programs and adding . . . certificate programs and . . . joint degree programs with other departments, making connections with other departments so that it would be a little more difficult to get rid of us without people noticing it and maybe complaining" was a strategic tact. This tact is seen in the proposal.
This definitive focus on interdisciplinarity is different than some of the other proposals that had previously been rejected. After the previous proposal had been rejected for lacking "visionary and dynamic" leadership, the second attempts to provide greater emphasis on particulars of that visionary and dynamic status by suggesting not that the school is merely important, but that it is integrated within other departments. And in order to do so, it provides palpable examples that betray the information as resource and technology as hierarchical definitional models.
A second proposal to save the school, while retaining the overt information and technology definitions in its denotative descriptions, makes a significant change to these descriptions in its connotative meanings. For example, in the first proposal, technology was merely a tool. It was something that was hierarchically related to information and knowledge. And while this denotation is continued in the second proposal, it is often dropped when particulars are mentioned. For example, it is suggested "[g]raduates will . . . have broader and deeper technological competence"; they "be encouraged to take courses in other departments primarily targeted at students in those departments, with the goal of providing students in the new program with a deep, multidisciplinary background." If technology is merely a tool, why must graduates have broader and deeper competence? If information is merely a resource, why is it also suggested "Berkeley is an ideal place to address [the information] challenge, given [its] strength in such allied disciplines as computer science, business administration, cognitive science, and public policy?" These appeals seem leveraged by the other understandings of information and technology. On the surface, the original tropes of information as resource and technology as hierarchical remain, but the particulars of the situation suggest differently. These appeals, however, all relied on institutional standards, protocols, and procedures for bureaucratic communication.
INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY, INTERDISCIPLINARITY
Protocological rhetoric was key for the institutional changes in the school at Berkeley. The new school emerged because established information channels were leveraged in ways that would develop a new postmodern geography of institutionality-a new information school. Most notably, proposals for the new school were each sent through the bureaucracy established within the University of California school system. Proposals for change were channeled through committees using the same slow procedures that other types of institutional change used. These channels made the older school of Library and Information Studies difficult to decommission and provided the necessary time for department advocates to adjust their institutional strategies. The channels for proposal and information sharing-protocols-proceeded with their own tempos. These tempos enabled the resurgence of a School of Information. Further, protocological rhetoric provided the ability to appeal administrative decisions after they had been initially denied. More than one proposal could be submitted. Each proposal could be appealed. The procedures enabled communication strategies that could be readjusted given the response from other parts of the institution. This protocological affordance proved crucial for adjusting appeals to audience. Together, these protocological affordances were vital for enabling the creation of a new school.
There were several institutional ramifications from this example of protocological rhetoric. One way to view these documents is as attempts to legitimize a discipline through its infrastructural taxonomy. This idea takes statements about the Berkeley proposals at their word, like those of Nancy Van House, who said " [t] his culminates five years of thinking about how Berkeley can best address the needs of this emerging field" (Sanders, 1995) . Those statements provided a documentary history that makes a case for understanding how one discipline, when forced to legitimize its activities for another audience, produced a substantially different version of its key terms. Not only do these types of documents legitimize activities for others, they play key roles in reinforcing future infrastructures. It is important to understand the language, terminology, arguments, and syntax of the proposal while placing it in its larger infrastructural context.
There are a variety of grammatical complexities between the two proposals. In the first, there is an emphasis of information as resource and technology as predicated on that resource. The school is important because it knows how to move that resource. Their ensuing construction of technology makes sense. If one has a resource that others need, the technology becomes a secondary tool for delivery, at least in argument. In the second proposal, coinciding with the decisive appeal towards interdisciplinarity, I described a variety of connotative shifts in those information and technology. When the underlying particulars and activities are described, there is a wider recognition of information as constitutive. What we see is a major overhaul in the school that responds to the Berkeley administrative audience. When the prompt for legitimization includes widening one's community, perhaps the constitutive understanding of information and the less hierarchical relationships of technology make for a more appealing cultural logic to guide an informational discipline. The connotative descriptions of the second proposal suggest broader interests. A suggestion of information as constitutive and technology as more interactive-was correlated with a more well received message. At this point, I may be overreaching, but what I'm suggesting is that a modern university's emphasis on interdisciplinarity may simultaneously co-occur with differing power logics of the term information. That is a question that would need to be explored in future empirical work.
In this article I've described protocological rhetoric as an extension of institutional critique. Protocological rhetoric is an analysis and leveraging of an institution as information infrastructure. It focuses on identifying and exploiting the standards, classification, algorithms, and protocols of institutional information infrastructure. To demonstrate protocological rhetoric, the essay used an abbreviated historical case from the University of California, Berkeley. In that case I suggested that a larger infrastructure is at work in providing power to specific connotations of the word information and technology. Further, infrastructure provided the channels that enabled new types of institutionality-new types of change.
